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Abstract
The “productivity paradox” of information systems (IS) is that, despite enormous improvements in the
underlying technology, the benefits of IS spending have not been found in aggregate output statistics. One
explanation is that IS spending may lead to increases in product quality or variety which tend to be overlooked
in the aggregate statistics, even if they increase output at the firm-level. Furthermore, the restructuring and
cost-cutting that are often necessary to realize the potential benefits of IS have only recently been undertaken
in many firms.
Our study uses new firm-level data on several components of IS spending for 1987–1991. The dataset includes
367 large firms which generated approximately 1.8 trillion dollars in output in 1991. We supplemented the IS
data with data on other inputs, output, and price deflators from other sources. As a result, we could assess
several econometric models of the contribution of IS to firm-level productivity.
Our results indicate that IS spending has made a substantial and statistically significant contribution to firm
output. We find that the gross marginal product (MP) for computer capital averaged 81% for the firms in our
sample. We find that the MP for computer capital is at least as large as the marginal product of other types of
capital investment and that, dollar for dollar, IS labor spending generates at least as much output as spending
on non-IS labor and expenses. Because the models we applied were similar to those that have been previously
used to assess the contribution of IS and other factors of production, we attribute the different results to the
fact that our data set is more current and larger than others explored. We conclude that the productivity
paradox disappeared by 1991, at least in our sample of firms.
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ABSTRACT
The "productivity paradox" of information systems (IS) is that, despite enormous improvements in the
underlying technology, the benefits of IS spending have not been found in aggregate output statistics. One
explanation is that IS spending may lead to increases in product quality or variety which tend to be
overlooked in aggregate output statistics, even if they increase sales at the firm-level. Furthermore, the
restructuring and cost-cutting that are often necessary to realize the potential benefits of IS have only
recently been undertaken in many firms.
Our study uses new firm-level data on several components of IS spending for 1987-1991. The dataset
includes 367 large firms which generated approximately $1.8 trillion dollars in output in 1991. We
supplemented the IS data with data on other inputs, output, and price deflators from other sources. As a
result, we could assess several econometric models of the contribution of IS to firm-level productivity.
Our results indicate that IS have made a substantial and statistically significant contribution to firm
output. We find that between 1987 and 1991, gross return on investment (ROI) for computer capital
averaged 81% for the firms in our sample. We find that the ROI for computer capital is greater than the
return to other types of capital investment and that IS labor spending generates several times as much
output as spending on non-IS labor and expenses. Because the models we applied were essentially the
same as those that have been previously used to assess the contribution of IS and other factors of
production, we attribute the different results to the fact that our data set is more current and larger than
others explored. We conclude that the "productivity paradox" disappeared by 1991, at least in our sample
of firms.
1. INTRODUCTION
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Spending on information systems (IS), and in particular information technology (IT) capital, is widely
regarded as having enormous potential for reducing costs and enhancing the competitiveness of American
firms. Although spending has surged in the past decade, there is surprisingly little formal evidence linking
it to higher productivity. Several studies, such as those by Loveman (1994) and by Barua, Kriebel &
Mukhopadhyay (1991) have been unable to reject the hypothesis that computers add nothing at all to total
output, while others estimate that the marginal benefits are less than the marginal costs (Morrison &
Berndt, 1990).
This "productivity paradox" has alarmed managers and puzzled researchers. American corporations have
spent billions of dollars on computers and many firms have radically restructured their business processes
to take advantage of computers. If these investments have not increased the value produced or reduced
costs, then management must rethink their IS strategies. Roach (1987), who was among the first to
identify the productivity shortfall in the 1980s, is currently more optimistic about the current prospects for
productivity growth because many firms have finally begun to realize the potential labor savings enabled
by IT. However, because none of the previous estimates of IT productivity were based on recent data, this
hypothesis remains untested.
This study considers new evidence and finds sharply different results from previous studies. Our dataset is
based on five annual surveys of several hundred large firms for a total of 1121 observations [1] over the
period 1987-1991. The firms in our sample generated approximately $1.8 trillion dollars worth of gross
output in the United States in 1991, and their value-added accounted for about 13% of the 1991 US GDP
of $4.86 trillion [2] (Council of Economic Advisors, 1992). Because the identity of each of the
participating firms is known, we were able to supplement the IS data with data from several other sources.
As a result, we could assess several econometric models of the contribution of IS to firm-level
productivity.
Our examination of these data indicates that IS have made a substantial and statistically significant
contribution to the output of firms (Figure 1). Our point estimates indicate that, dollar for dollar, spending
on computer capital created more value than spending on other types of capital. We find that the
contribution of IS to output does not vary much across years, although there is weak evidence of a
decrease over time. We also find some evidence of differences across various sectors of the economy.
Technological factors also appear to affect returns. For instance, we find that neither firms which relied
heavily on mainframes, nor firms which emphasized PC usage performed as well as firms that invested in
a mix of mainframes and personal computers (PCs).
For the firms in our sample, we estimate that the gross return on investment for computers to be over 50%
annually. Considering a 95% confidence interval around our estimates, we can reject the hypothesis that
computers add nothing to total output. Furthermore, several of our regressions suggest that the return on
investment for computers is significantly higher than the return on investment for other types of capital.
Our findings suggest that if there ever was a "productivity paradox", it disappeared in the 1987-1991
period, at least for our sample of large firms.
1.1 Previous research on IT and productivity
There is a broad literature on IT value which has been recently reviewed in detail elsewhere
(Brynjolfsson, 1993; Wilson, 1993). Many of these studies examined correlations between IT spending
ratios and various performance measures, such as profits or stock returns (Dos Santos, Peffers & Mauer,
1993; Harris & Katz, 1988; Strassmann, 1990), and some found that the correlation was either zero or
very low. In interpreting these findings, it is important to bear in mind that economic theory predicts that
in equilibrium, high computer investors would not, on average, have higher profitability or stock market
returns. Managers should be as likely to over-spend as to under-spend, so high spending should not
necessarily be "better". Where correlations are found, they should be interpreted as indicating an
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unexpectedly high or low contribution of information technology, as compared to the performance that
was anticipated when the investments were made. Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, zero or weak
correlations between the percentage of spending allocated to IT and profitability would not indicate a low
payoff to computers.
To examine the contribution of IT, it is helpful to work within a well-defined theoretical framework. For
instance, Alpar & Kim (1990) found that methods based firmly on production theory from economics
could yield insights that were not apparent when more loosely constrained statistical analyses were
performed. The economic theory of production provides a particularly relevant framework. This theory
posits that the output of a firm is related to its inputs via a production function and that each input should
make a positive contribution to output. A further prediction of the theory is that the marginal cost of the
last unit of each input should just equal the marginal benefit produced by that input. Literally hundreds of
studies have estimated production functions with various inputs, and the predictions of economic theory
have generally been confirmed (See Berndt, 1991, especially chapters 3 and 9, for an excellent review of
many of these studies).
The "productivity paradox" is most accurately linked to a subset of studies based on the theory of
production which either found no positive correlation overall (Barua, Kriebel & Mukhopadhyay, 1991;
Loveman, 1994), or found that benefits fell short of costs (Morrison & Berndt, 1990). Using a subset of
the PIMS database [3], Loveman (1994) concluded: "Investments in IT showed no net contribution to
total output," and Barua, Kriebel and Mukhudpadhyay (1991) found that computer investments are not
significantly correlated with increases in return on assets. Similarly, Morrison and Berndt (1990)
examined industry-level data using a production function that controlled for changes in other inputs and
found that each dollar spent on "high tech" capital [4]increased measured output by only 80 cents on the
margin.
Although previous work provides little econometric evidence that computers improve productivity,
Brynjolfsson's (1993) review of the overall literature on this "productivity paradox" concludes that the
"shortfall of evidence is not necessarily evidence of a shortfall." He notes that increases in product variety
and quality should properly be counted as part of the value of output, but that the price deflators that the
government currently uses to remove the effects of inflation do not properly reflect this value. As a result,
inflation is overestimated and real output is underestimated by an equivalent amount (because real output
is estimated by multiplying nominal output by a price deflator). In addition, as with any new technology, a
period of learning, adjustment and restructuring may be necessary to reap its full benefits. Accordingly, he
argues that "mismeasurement" and "lags" are two of four viable explanations (along with "redistribution"
and "mismanagement") for the collected findings of earlier studies. This leaves the question of computer
productivity open to continuing debate.
Industry-level output statistics have historically been the only data that are available for a broad cross-
section of the economy. In a related study using much of the same data as the Morrison & Berndt (1990)
study, Berndt and Morrison (1994) conclude, "...there is a statistically significant negative relationship
between productivity growth and the high-tech intensity of the capital." However, they also point out: "it
is possible that the negative productivity results are due to measurement problems...". Part of the difficulty
is that industry-level data does not provide sufficient detail to distinguish firms within a particular
industry which invest heavily in IT from those with low IT investments. Only comparisons among
industries can be made, yet these comparisons can be sensitive to price deflators used, which in turn
depend on the assumptions about how much quality improvement has occurred in each industry.
Firm-level production functions, on the other hand, will better reflect the "true" outputs of the firm,
insofar as the increased sales at each firm can be directly linked to its use of computers and other inputs,
and all the firms are subject to the same industry-level price deflator.
On the other hand, a weakness of firm-level data is that it can be painstaking to collect, and therefore,
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studies with firm level data have historically focused on relatively narrow samples. This has made it
difficult to draw generalizable results from these studies. For instance, Weill (1992) found some positive
impacts for investments in some categories of IS but not for overall IS spending. However, the 33
strategic business units in his sample from the valve manufacturing industry accounted for less than $2
billion in total sales, and he notes, "The findings of the study have limited external validity." (Weill,
1992.) By the same token, the Loveman (1994) and Barua, Kriebel and Mukhudpadhyay (1991) studies
were based on data from only 20 firms in the 1978-82 period and derived only fairly imprecise estimates
of IT's relationship to firm performance.
1.2 Data Issues
The imprecision of previous estimates highlights an inherent difficulty of measuring the benefits of IT
investment. To better understand the perceived benefits, we conducted several interviews with managers
which revealed that they focus on five principal rationales for investing in IT: labor savings, improved
quality, greater product variety, better customer service, and faster response time. In principle, all of these
benefits should be incorporated in the government price deflators that convert nominal sales to real
output. In practice, the value of many of the benefits of IT, other than labor savings, are not well captured
in aggregate productivity or output statistics. [5]
Computers represent on the order of 1% of firms' expenses in most historical data sets. This makes it very
difficult to distinguish the contribution of IT from random shocks that affect productivity. As Simon
(1984) has observed:
In the physical sciences, when errors of measurement and other noise are found to be of the same order of
magnitude as the phenomena under study, the response is not to try to squeeze more information out of
the data by statistical means; it is instead to find techniques for observing the phenomena at a higher level
of resolution. The corresponding strategy for economics is obvious: to secure new kinds of data at the
micro level.
A convincing assessment of IS productivity would ideally employ a sample which included a large share
of the economy (as in the Berndt and Morrison studies), but at a level of detail that disaggregated inputs
and outputs for individual firms (as in Loveman (1994), Barua et al. (1991), and Weill (1992)).
Furthermore, because the recent restructuring of many firms may have been essential to realizing the
benefits of IS spending, the data should be as current as possible. Lack of such detailed data has hampered
previous efforts. While our paper applies essentially the same models as those used in earlier studies, we
use new, firm-level data which is more recent, more detailed and includes more companies. We believe
this accounts for our sharply different results.
1.3 Theoretical Issues
As discussed above, Brynjolfsson (1993) presents a number of hypotheses for explaining the productivity
paradox, including the possibility that it is an artifact of mismeasurement. We consider this possibility in
this paper.
More formally, we statistically test the following hypotheses:
H1) The output contributions of computer capital and IS staff labor are positive;
H2) The output contributions of computer capital and IS staff labor are greater than their costs.
The "productivity paradox" of computers questions whether these hypotheses are empirically valid.
In our analysis, we build on a long research stream which applies production theory to determine the
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contributions of various inputs to output. [6] This approach uses economic theory to determine the set of
relevant variables and to define the structural relationships among them. The relationship can then be
estimated econometrically and compared with the predictions of economic theory. In particular, for any
given set of inputs, the maximum amount of output that can be produced, according to the known laws of
nature and existing "technology", is determined by a production function. As noted by Berndt (1991),
various combinations of inputs can be used to produce a given level of output, so a production function
can be thought of as pages of a book containing alternative blueprints. This is essentially an engineering
definition, but business implications can be drawn by adding an assumption about how firms behave, such
as profit maximization or cost minimization. Under either assumption, no inputs will be "wasted", so the
only way to increase output for a given production function is to increase at least one input.
The theory of production not only posits a relationship among inputs and output, but also posits that this
relationship may vary depending on particular circumstances. Many of these differences can be explicitly
modeled by a sufficiently general production function without adding additional variables. For instance, it
is common to assume that there are constant returns to scale, but more general models will allow for
increasing or decreasing returns to scale. In this way, it is possible to see whether large firms are more or
less efficient than smaller firms. Other differences may have to do with the economic environment
surrounding the firm, and are not directly related to inputs. Such differences are properly modeled as
additional "control" variables. Depending on prices and desired levels of output, different firms may
choose different combinations of inputs and outputs, but they will all adhere to the set defined by their
production function. The neoclassical economic theory of production has been fairly successful
empirically, despite the fact that it treats firms as "black boxes" and thus ignores history or details of the
internal organization of firms. Of course, in the real world, such factors can make a significant difference
and recent advances in the theory of the firm may enable them to be more rigorously modeled as well.
To operationalize the theory for our sample, we assume that the firms in our sample produce a quantity of
OUTPUT (Q) via a production function (F), whose inputs are COMPUTER CAPITAL (C),
NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL (K), IS STAFF labor (S), and OTHER LABOR AND EXPENSES (L). [7]
These inputs comprise the sum total of all spending by the firm and all capitalized investment.
Economists historically have not distinguished computer capital from capital, lumping them together as a
single variable. Similarly, previous estimates of production functions have not distinguished IS staff labor
from other types of labor and expenses. However, for our purposes, making this distinction will allow us
to directly examine hypothesis such as H1 and H2 above. We seek to allow for fairly general types of
influences by allowing for any type of environmental factors which affect the industry or business sector
(i) in which the company operates and year (t) in which the observation was made. [8] Thus, we can
write:
Q = F(C, K, S, L; i,t) (1)
Output and each of the input variables can be measured in either physical units or dollars. If measured in
dollar terms, the results will more closely reflect the ultimate objective of the firm (profits, or revenues
less costs). However, this approach requires that we account for inflation and the changing prices of
different inputs and outputs over time and in different industries. This can be done by multiplying the
nominal dollar value of each variable in each year by an associated deflator to get the real dollar values.
This approach also partially accounts for changes in product quality or variety to the extent that changes
in output characteristics are incorporated into the price deflators.
Some companies will be more efficient than others at converting inputs to outputs. The amount of output
that can be produced for a given unit of a given input is often measured as the return on investment of the
input. When examining differences in the returns of a factor across firms or time periods, it is important to
control for the effects of changes in the other inputs to production. One way to do this is to assume that
the production function, F, has some functional form, and then estimate its parameters. This approach has
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been widely applied empirically (Berndt, 1991, pp. 449-460).
The economic theory of production places certain technical constraints on the choice of functional form,
such as quasi-concavity and monotonicity (Varian, 1992). In addition, we observe that firms use multiple
inputs in production, so the functional form should also include the flexibility to allow continuous
adjustment between inputs as the relative prices of inputs change. [9] Perhaps the simplest functional
form that relates inputs to outputs and is consistent with these constraints is the Cobb-Douglas
specification, variants of which have been used since 1896 (Berndt, 1991). This specification is probably
the most common one used when estimating production functions and remains the standard for studies
such as ours, which seek to account for output growth by looking at inputs and other factors. [10]
Q =  (2)
In this specification, b1 and b3 are the output elasticity of COMPUTER CAPITAL and information
systems staff (IS STAFF), respectively. [11]If the coefficients b0 - b4 sum to 1, then the production
function exhibits constant returns to scale. However, increasing or decreasing returns to scale can also be
modeled with the above function. The principal restriction implied by the Cobb-Douglas form is that the
elasticity of substitution between factors is constrained to be equal to -1. This means that as the price of a
particular input increases, the amount of the input employed will decrease by a proportionate amount, and
the quantities other inputs will increase to maintain the same level of output. As a result, this formulation
is not appropriate for determining whether inputs are substitutes or complements. Other more complicated
functional forms such as the Transcendental Logarithmic, or Translog, formulation relaxes this restriction.
We consider several other functional forms in section 3.3 and confirm the appropriateness of the
Cobb-Douglas specification for estimating output elasticities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we describe the statistical methodology
and data of our study. The results are presented in section 3. In section 4, we conclude with a discussion
of the implications of our results.
2. METHODS AND DATA
2.1 Estimating Procedures
The basic Cobb-Douglas specification is obviously not linear in its parameters. However, by taking
logarithms of equation (2) and adding an error term (e), one can derive an equivalent equation that can be
estimated by linear regression. For estimation, we have organized the equations as a system of five
equations, one for each year: [12]
Log Qi,87 = b0 + b1 Log Ci,87 + b2 Log Ki,87 + b3 Log Si,87 + b4 Log Li,87 + e87 (3a)
Log Qi,88 = b0 + b1 Log Ci,88 + b2 Log Ki,88 + b3 Log Si,88 + b4 Log Li,88 + e88 (3b)
Log Qi,89 = b0 + b1 Log Ci,89 + b2 Log Ki,89 + b3 Log Si,89 + b4 Log Li,89 + e89 (3c)
Log Qi,90 = b0 + b1 Log Ci,90 + b2 Log Ki,90 + b3 Log Si,90 + b4 Log Li,90 + e90 (3d)
Log Qi,91 = b0 + b1 Log Ci,91 + b2 Log Ki,91 + b3 Log Si,91 + b4 Log Li,91 + e91 (3e)
While each individual equation is based on a cross-section of the data, by constraining the coefficients on
each factor to be equivalent in different years, time series variation in the data will also be reflected in the
estimates of the system as a whole. In fact, under the assumption that the error terms in each equation are
independently and identically distributed, estimating this system of equations is equivalent to pooling the
data and estimating the parameters by ordinary least squares (OLS). However, it is likely that the variance
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of the error term varies across years, and that there is some correlation between the error terms across
years. It is therefore possible to get more efficient estimates of the parameters by using the technique of
Iterated Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (ISUR). [13]
As equations (3a) - (3e) are written, we have imposed the usual restriction that the parameters are equal
across the sample, which allows the most precise estimates of the parameter values. We can also allow
some or all of the parameters to vary over time or by firm characteristics, although this additional
information is generally obtained at the expense of lowering the precision of the estimates. We will
explore some of these alternative specifications in the results section; however, the main results of this
paper are based on the system of equations shown in (3a)-(3e).
2.3 Data Sources and Variable Construction
This study employs a unique data set on IS spending by large U.S. firms which was compiled by
International Data Group (IDG). The information is collected in an annual survey of IS managers at large
firms [14]that has been conducted since 1987. Respondents are asked to provide the market value of
central processors (mainframes, minicomputers, supercomputers) used by the firm in the U.S., the total
central IS budget, the percentage of the IS budget devoted to labor expenses, the number of PCs and
terminals in use, and other IT related information.
Since the names of the firms are known and most of them are publicly traded, the IS spending information
from the IDG survey could be matched to Compustat II [15] to obtain measures of output, capital
investment, expenses, number of employees and industry classification. In addition, these data were also
combined with price deflators for output, capital, employment costs, expenses and IT capital.
There is some discretion as to how the years are matched between the survey and Compustat. The survey
is completed at the end of the year for data on the following year. Since we are primarily interested in the
value of computer capital stock, and the survey is timed to be completed by the beginning of the new
fiscal year, we interpret the survey data as a beginning of period value, which we then match to the end of
year data on Compustat (for the previous period). This also allows us to make maximum use of the survey
data and is the same approach used by IDG for their reports based on these data (e.g. Maglitta and
Sullivan-Trainor, 1991).
IDG reports the "market value of central processors" (supercomputers, mainframes and minicomputers)
but only the total number of "PCs and terminals". Therefore, the variable for COMPUTER CAPITAL was
obtained by adding the "market value of central processors" to an estimate of the value of PCs and
terminals, which was computed by multiplying the weighted average value for PCs and terminals by the
number of PCs and terminals. [16] This approach yields roughly equal values, in aggregate, for central
processors ($33.0 Bn) as for PCs and terminals ($30.4 Bn) in 1991. These values corroborated by a
separate survey by IDG (IDC, 1991) which tabulates shipments of computer equipment by category. This
aggregate computer capital is then deflated by the computer systems deflator reported in Gordon (1993).
The variables for IS STAFF, NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE and OUTPUT were computed by
multiplying the relevant quantity from the IDG survey or Compustat by a price deflator. IS STAFF was
computed by multiplying the IS Budget figure from the IDC survey by the "percentage of the IS budget
devoted to labor expenses...", and deflating this figure. NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE was computed
by deflating total expense and subtracting deflated IS STAFF from this value. Thus, all the expenses of a
firm are allocated to either IS STAFF or NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE.
Total capital for each firm was computed from book value of capital stock, adjusted for inflation by
assuming that all investment was made at an calculated average age (total depreciation/current
depreciation) of the capital stock. [17]From this total capital figure, we subtract the deflated value of
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COMPUTER CAPITAL to get NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL. Thus, all capital of a firm is allocated to
either COMPUTER CAPITAL or NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL. The approach to constructing total
capital follows the methods used by other authors who have studied the rate of return to specific
production factors using a similar methodology (Hall, 1990; Mairesse & Hall, 1993).
The firms in this sample are quite large. Their average sales were nearly $6.2 billion in 1991. In many
other respects, they are fairly representative of the US economy as a whole. For instance, their computer
capital stock averages just over 2% of total sales, or about $216 million, which is consistent with the
capital flow tables for the US economy published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Similarly, the
average IS budget as a share of sales was very close to the figure reported in a distinct survey by
CSC/Index. A summary of the sources, construction procedure and deflator for each variable are provided
in Table 1, and sample statistics are shown in Tables 2a and 2b.
2.4 Potential Data Problems
There are a number of possible errors in the data, either as a result of errors in source data or inaccuracies
introduced by the data construction methods employed. First, the IDG data on IS spending are largely
self-reported and therefore the accuracy depends on the diligence of the respondents. Some data elements
require some degree of judgment -- particularly the market value of central processors and the total
number of PCs and terminals. Also, not all companies responded to the survey, and even those that did
respond in one year may not have responded in every other year. This may result in sample selection bias.
For instance, high performing firms (or perhaps low performing firms) may have been more interested in
participating to the survey. Fortunately, most of the firms in the target group did respond and, as discussed
above, descriptive statistics for the sample appear to be broadly consistent with data from other sources.
However, the effect of the potential errors discussed above will probably be small. The information is
intended to be published and therefore the participants have the incentive to diligently respond to the
survey, and we have checked the aggregate values against other independent sources. We used different,
independent source (Compustat) for our performance measures and for our IT variables, making it
difficulty to "game" the survey. We also examined whether the performance of the firms in our sample (as
measured by return on equity (ROE)) differ from the population of Fortune 500 Manufacturing and
Fortune 500 Service firms. Our results indicate that there are no statistically significant differences
between Fortune 500 firms in our sample and those that are not (t-stat = 0.7), which suggests that our
sample is not disproportionately comprised of "good" or "bad" firms. However, since the sampling
method targets the largest of the Fortune 500 firms, the average firm in our sample is roughly twice as
large as the average Fortune 500 firm. Finally, the response rate of the sample is relatively high at over
75%, suggesting that firms are not selectively participating. These factors suggest that sample selection
bias is not driving the results.
Second, there are a number of reasons why IS STAFF and COMPUTER CAPITAL may be understated,
although by construction these errors do not reduce total capital and total expense for the firm. The survey
is restricted to central IS spending in the U.S. plus PCs and terminals both inside and outside the central
department. Some firms may have significant expenditures on information systems outside the central
department or outside the U.S. In addition, the narrow definitions of IS spending employed in this study
may exclude significant costs that could be legitimately counted as COMPUTER CAPITAL such as
software and communication networks. Furthermore, by including only the labor portion of IS expenses
in IS STAFF as a separate variable (in order to prevent double counting of capital expenditure), other
parts of the IS budget are left in the NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE category. The effects of these
problems on the final results are discussed in the Results section.
A third area of potential inaccuracy comes from the price deflators. Numerous authors (Baily & Gordon,
1988; Siegel & Griliches, 1991) have criticized the current methods employed by the BEA for
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constructing industry-level price deflators. It has been argued that these methods fail to fully account for
quality change or other intangible improvements. If consumer purchases are in part affected by intangible
quality improvements, the use of firm level data should provide some improvement, because firms which
provide quality improvement will have higher sales and can be directly compared to firms in the same
industry.
Finally, the measurement of OUTPUT and COMPUTER CAPITAL input in certain service industries
appeared particularly troublesome. For financial services, we found that OUTPUT was poorly predicted
in our model, presumably because of problems in defining and quantifying the output of financial
institutions. [18]In the telecommunications industry, it has been argued (Popkin, 1992) that many of the
productivity gains have come from very large investments in computer-based telephone switching gear,
which is primarily classified as communications equipment and not COMPUTER CAPITAL, although it
may be highly correlated with measured computer capital. We therefore excluded all firms in the financial
services industries (SIC60 - SIC69), and telecommunications (SIC48). [19]
3. RESULTS
3.1 Basic results
The basic estimates for this study are obtained by estimating the system of equations (3a)- (3e) by ISUR
(see section 2.2). Note that we allow the intercept term to vary across sectors and years.
As reported in column 1 of Table 3, our estimate of b1 indicates that COMPUTER CAPITAL is correlated
with a statistically significant increase in OUTPUT. Specifically, we estimate that the elasticity of output
for COMPUTER CAPITAL is 0.0169 when all the other input are held constant. Because COMPUTER
CAPITAL accounted for an average of 2.09% of the value of output each year, this implies a gross ROI
(increase in dollar output per dollar of capital stock ) for COMPUTER CAPITAL of approximately 81%
per year. [20] In other words, for every additional dollar of computer capital stock that a firm has, its
output will increase by 81 cents per year on the margin. [21]
The estimate for the output elasticity for IS STAFF was 0.0178, which indicates that each dollar spent
here is associated with a marginal increase in OUTPUT of $2.62. The surprisingly high return to
information systems labor may reflect systematic differences in human capital, [22] since IS staff are
likely to have more education than other workers. The high return is certainly consistent with Krueger's
(1991) finding that workers who use computers are paid a wage premium.
The above estimates strongly support hypothesis H1, that the contribution of IT is positive. The t-statistics
for our estimates of the elasticity of COMPUTER CAPITAL and IS STAFF are 3.92 and 3.38,
respectively, so we can reject the null hypothesis of zero contribution of IT at the 0.001 (two-tailed)
confidence level for both. We can also reject the joint hypothesis that they are both equal to zero
(c2(2)=43.9, p<.0001).
To assess H2 (that the contribution of IT is greater than its cost) it is necessary to estimate the cost of
COMPUTER CAPITAL and IS STAFF. After these costs are subtracted from the gross benefits reported
above, we can then assess whether the remaining "net" benefits are positive. Because IS STAFF is a flow
variable, calculating net benefits is straightforward: a dollar of IS STAFF costs one dollar, so the gross
returns of $2.62 imply net returns of $1.62. For IS STAFF, we can reject the null hypothesis that the
returns equal costs in favor of the hypothesis that returns exceed costs at the .05 confidence level
(c2(1)=4.4, p<.035).
Assessing H2 for COMPUTER CAPITAL, which is a stock variable, requires that we determine how
much of the capital stock is "used up" each year and must be replaced just to return to the level at the
beginning of the year. This is done by multiplying the annual depreciation [23] rate for computers by the
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capital stock in place. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the average service life of "Office,
Computing and Accounting Machinery" is seven years (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1987). If a seven
year service life for computer capital is assumed, then the above gross returns should be reduced by
subtracting just over 14% per year, so that after seven years the capital stock will be fully replaced. This
procedure yields a net return of 67%. However, a more conservative assumption is that COMPUTER
CAPITAL (in particular PCs) could have an average service life as short as 3 years, which implies that the
net rate of return should be reduced by 33%. This would yield a net ROI estimate of 48%. In either case,
we can reject the null hypothesis that the net marginal returns to computers are zero (p < .01). [24]
An alternative approach to assessing H2 is to consider the opportunity cost of investing in COMPUTER
CAPITAL or IS STAFF. A dollar spent in either of these areas could have generated a gross return of over
6% if it had instead been spent on NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL or a net return of 7% if it were spent on
OTHER LABOR AND EXPENSE. This suggests that the net benefits were not positive unless they
exceeded these returns by a statistically significant margin.
As shown in Table 6, we can reject the hypothesis that the net ROI for COMPUTER CAPITAL is equal to
the ROI for NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL, assuming a service life of as little as 3 years for COMPUTER
CAPITAL (and none in NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL) at the .05 confidence level. Similarly, we can
reject the hypothesis that IS STAFF generates the same returns as spending on OTHER LABOR AND
EXPENSE (p < .05).
Our confidence in the regression taken as a whole is increased by the fact that the estimated output
elasticities for the other factors of production were all positive and each was consistent not only with
economic theory (i.e. they imply a real rate of return on non-IT factors of 6%-7%), but also with estimates
of other researchers working with similar data (e.g. Hall, 1993; Loveman, 1994). Furthermore, the
elasticities summed to just over one, implying constant or slightly increasing returns to scale overall,
which is consistent with the estimates of aggregate production functions by other researchers (Berndt,
1991). The R2 hovered around 99%, indicating that our independent variables could "explain" most of the
variance in output.
Taken together, our results suggest that during the 1987-1991 time period, firms could have created more
value if they had spent more on computer capital and labor and less on non-computer capital and labor
than they actually did. In the conclusion section, we discuss some reasons why managers may have made
decisions which, with the benefit of hindsight, appear to have been sub-optimal. First, however, we will
further analyze the robustness of our results.
3.2 What factors affect the rates of return for computers?
The estimates described above were based on the assumption that the parameters did not vary over time,
in different sectors, or across different subsamples of firms. Therefore, they should be interpreted only as
overall averages. However, by using the multiple equations approach, it is also possible to address
questions like: "Has the return to computers been consistently high, or did it vary over time?" and "Have
some sectors of the economy had more success in using computers?" We respond to these questions by
allowing the parameters to vary by year or by sector.
Economic theory predicts that managers will increase investments in any inputs that achieve higher than
normal returns, and that as investment increases, marginal rates of return eventually fall to "normal"
levels. This pattern is supported by our findings for COMPUTER CAPITAL, which exhibited higher
levels of investment (Figure 2) and lower returns over time (Figure 3). We find that the rates of return are
fairly consistent over the period 1987-1989 and then drop in 1990-1991. We can reject the null hypothesis
of equality of returns over time in the full sample (c2(4)=11.2, p<.02). However, even at the end of the
period, the returns to COMPUTER CAPITAL still exceed the returns to NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL.
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However, these results should be interpreted with caution since the composition of the sample changes
from year to year and 1991 was a recession year. [25]
Roach (1987) has argued that the service sector uses computers much less efficiently than manufacturing
and points to aggregate statistics which report higher overall productivity growth for manufacturing than
for services. Others have argued that aggregate output in the service sector is poorly measured and this is
the cause of the apparent shortfall of productivity in this sector (Griliches, 1992). Our data enable us to
estimate the contribution of computers to sales at the firm level, without relying on aggregate data.
The returns on COMPUTER CAPITAL across sectors are present in Figure 4. The rate of return (ignoring
the mining sector which includes only 10 firms and has a large standard error) varies from 10% in
transportation and utilities to 127% in durable manufacturing. The high returns in the two manufacturing
sectors may be due to greater competition, especially from international sources, or better measurability
of the inputs and outputs in these sectors. While there have been some suggestions that reorganizing
service processes around a "factory" model would help achieve comparable results in services, we cannot
confirm that the differences in measured returns are due to fundamental differences, or simply "noise" in
the data. Although the returns to computers in durable and non-durable manufacturing are as high or
higher than the returns in any other sector, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that these rates of return
are the same across most sectors due to the large standard errors on the coefficient estimates (without
mining, c2(4)=6.6, p<.16).
A second area that can be addressed by our data and method is technology strategy. We have already
shown that firms with more computer capital will, ceteris paribus, have higher sales than firms with
proportionately less computer capital, but do the types of computer equipment purchased make a
difference? We have data on two categories of equipment: 1) central processors, such as mainframes, and
2) PCs and terminals. For this analysis, we divide the sample into three groups based on the ratio of
central processor value to PCs and terminals. We find that the rate of return is highest for firms using a
more balanced mix of PCs and mainframes (Table 4), and lower for firms at either extreme. One
interpretation of this finding is that an IS strategy which relies too heavily on one category of equipment
will be less effective than a more even-handed approach which allows a better "division of labor".
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis and Possible Biases - Econometric Issues
Our estimates of the return to COMPUTER CAPITAL required that a number of assumptions be made
about the econometric specification and the construction of the data set. This section and the following
section explore the validity of our assumptions and generally finds that the results are robust.
The primary econometric assumption required for ISUR to produce unbiased estimates of both the
parameters and the standard errors are similar to those for OLS: the error term must be uncorrelated with
the regressors (inputs) and homoskedastic in the cross section. [26] ISUR implicitly corrects for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity over time in our formulation, so that additional restrictions on the error
structure are not necessary. Nonetheless, we computed single-year OLS estimates both with and without
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors [27] to examine whether heteroskedasticity is an issue for the
cross-section. The standard error estimates were within 10-20% of each other, indicating that
heteroskedasticity does not appear to be a problem. To test normality of the error terms, we computed and
plotted residuals from the basic specification, and found them to be roughly normally distributed. It
should be noted that even if these assumptions were violated, the coefficient estimates (even for OLS)
would still be unbiased and consistent, and therefore represent accurate measures of the contribution of
IT.
However, the third assumption, that the error term is uncorrelated with the inputs, is potentially an issue.
One way in which this assumption could be violated is if the causality is reversed: instead of increases in
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purchases of inputs (e.g. computers) leading to higher output, an increase in output could lead to further
investment (for example, a firm spends the proceeds from an unexpected increase in demand on more
computer equipment). In this case, the assumptions for ISUR are violated since the inputs are not
predetermined, and therefore the error term is likely to be correlated with them. The assumption could
also be violated if the input variables are measured with error [28] (see (Kmenta, 1986) for a complete
discussion).
Regardless of the source of the error, it is possible to correct for the potential bias using instrumental
variables methods, or two-stage least squares (2SLS). This method employs instrumental variables to
filter out the endogenous variation and error in the variables, which then allows consistent estimation of
the parameters. We use once-lagged values of variables as instruments, since by definition they cannot be
associated with unanticipated shocks in the dependent variable in the following year. [29] Table 5 reports
a comparison of pooled OLS estimates with 2SLS estimates and shows that the coefficient estimates are
similar although somewhat higher for COMPUTER CAPITAL and lower for IS STAFF. In both cases the
standard errors were substantially larger, as is expected when instrumental variables are used. Using a
Hausman specification test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with
the regressors (see bottom of Table 5 for test statistics), and therefore accept our initial specification.
All the results discussed previously assumed that the production function was of the Cobb-Douglas form.
While this approach is well grounded in previous research, further insight into the role of computer capital
may be gained by allowing a more flexible functional form such as the translog. [30]
When we estimated a translog production function, the calculated value of the COMPUTER CAPITAL
elasticity was .0108, [31]which is comparable to the Cobb-Douglas estimate, although the standard error
was much higher, presumably due to the large number of additional parameters which had to be
estimated. [32] This lends support to the assertion made by Griliches (1979) that the choice of functional
form is not critical in the estimation of output elasticities.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Possible Biases - Data Issues
To further explore the robustness of our results, we examined impact of the possible data errors discussed
in section 2.4 that can be tested: 1) error in the valuation of PCs and terminals, 2) understatement of
computer capital, and 3) errors in the price deflators.
To assess the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions of the value of PCs and terminals, we
recalculated the basic regressions varying the assumed average PC and terminal value from $0 to $6K.
Note that as the assumed value of PCs and terminals increases, the increase in COMPUTER CAPITAL
will be matched by an equal decrease in NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL, which is calculated as a residual.
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 5, the return to COMPUTER CAPITAL in the basic regression is not
very sensitive to the assumed value of PCs and terminals, ranging from 77% if they are not counted to
59% if PCs and terminals are counted at $6K. The reason the return rises at first when PCs and terminals
are counted as part of COMPUTER CAPITAL is presumably that firms with large investments in PCs and
terminals have higher output than similar firms without such investments. Initially, this increased output
raises the estimated elasticity of COMPUTER CAPITAL by more than the assumed costs of PCs and
terminals, and therefore the estimated return to computers increases.
Our estimates of the return to COMPUTER CAPITAL or IS STAFF may be overstated since, as discussed
in section 2.3, the true cost of computer capital and IS staff may be understated. If the hidden IS costs do
not show up elsewhere in the firm, then the effect on the estimated returns is dependent on how closely
correlated these costs are to our measured COMPUTER CAPITAL. If they are uncorrelated, our estimate
for the elasticity and the return to COMPUTER CAPITAL is unbiased. If the missing costs are perfectly
correlated with the observed costs, then, because of the logarithmic form of our specification, they will
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result only in a multiplicative scaling of the variables, and the estimated elasticities and the estimated
standard error will be unchanged. [33] For the same reason, the sign and statistical significance of our
results for the returns to COMPUTER CAPITAL and IS STAFF will be also unaffected. However, the
denominator used for the ROI calculations will be affected by increasing computer capital so the
estimated ROI will be proportionately lower or higher. For instance, if the hidden costs lead to a doubling
of the true costs of computer capital, then the true ROI would fall from 81% to just over 40%. Finally, if
the hidden costs are negatively correlated with the observed costs, then the true returns would be higher
than our estimates.
Another possibility is that the hidden IS capital expenses (e.g. software) show up elsewhere, such as in the
NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE category. To estimate the potential impact of these omissions, we
estimate the potential size of the omitted misclassified IS capital relative to COMPUTER CAPITAL using
data from another IDG survey (IDC, 1991) on aggregate IS expenditures, including software as well as
hardware. To derive a reasonable lower bound on the returns to COMPUTER CAPITAL, we assume that
the misclassified IS capital had an average service life of three years, and further make the worst-case
assumption of perfect correlation between misclassified IS capital and COMPUTER CAPITAL (and
reduce proportionally the amount of NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE). In this scenario, our estimates
for the amount of COMPUTER CAPITAL in firms roughly doubles, yet the rates of return are little
unchanged from the basic analysis that does not include misclassified IS capital (68% vs. 81%). This
surprising result appears to be due to the fact that the return on NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE is at
least as high as the return on COMPUTER CAPITAL, so moving costs from one category to another does
not change overall returns much.
It should be noted that the definition of COMPUTER CAPITAL used in this study was fairly narrow and
did not include items such as telecommunications equipment, scientific instruments, networking
equipment. The findings should be interpreted accordingly and do not necessarily apply to broader
definitions of IT.
One final contribution to error is the understatement of output due to errors in the price deflators. While it
is difficult to directly correct for this problem, we estimated the basic equations year by year, so that
errors in the relative deflators would have no impact on the elasticity estimates. The estimated returns
ranged 109% to 197% versus 81% when all five years were estimated simultaneously. The standard error
on the estimates was significantly higher for all estimates, which can account for the greater range of
estimates. Overall, this suggests that our basic findings are not a result of the assumed price deflators.
However, if the price deflators systematically underestimate the value of intangible product change over
time or between firms, our measure of output will be understated, implying that the actual return for
computer capital is higher than our estimates.
On balance, we may have underestimated both IS input and final output. The directions of the resulting
biases go in opposite directions, but under reasonable assumptions they do not appear to obviate the basic
finding that the return on IS capital and labor spending is statistically significant and exceeds that of other
types of capital and labor.
4. DISCUSSION
4.1 Comparison with earlier research
Although we found that computer capital and IS labor increase output significantly, several other studies
have failed to find evidence that IT increases output. Because the models we used were similar to those
used by several previous researchers, we attribute our different findings primarily to the larger and more
recent data set we used. Specifically, there are at least three reasons why our results may differ from
previous results.
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First, we examined a later time period, (1987-1991), than did Loveman (1978-1982), Barua et al.
(1978-1982) or Berndt & Morrison (1968-1986). The massive build-up of computer capital is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Indeed, the delivered amount of computer power in the companies in our sample is
likely to be at least an order of magnitude greater than that in comparable firms from the period studied by
the other authors. Brynjolfsson (1993) argues that even if the ROI of IT were twice that of non-IT capital,
its impact on output in the 1970s or early 1980s would not have been large enough to be detected by
conventional estimation procedures. Furthermore, the changes in business processes needed to realize the
benefits of IT may have taken some time to implement, so it is possible that the actual returns from
investments in computers were initially fairly low. In particular, computers may have initially created
organizational slack which was only recently eliminated, perhaps hastened by the increased attention
engendered by earlier studies that indicated a potential productivity shortfall and suggestions that "to
computerize the office, you have to reinvent the office" (Thurow, 1990). Apparently, an analogous period
of organizational redesign was necessary to unleash the benefits of electric motors (David, 1989).
A pattern of low initial returns is also consistent with the strategy for optimal investment in the presence
of learning-by-using: short-term returns should initially be lower than returns for other capital, but
subsequently rise to exceed the returns to other capital, compensating for the "investment" in learning
(Lester & McCabe, 1993). Under this interpretation, our high estimates of computer ROI indicate that
businesses are beginning to reap rewards from the experimentation and learning phase in the early 1980s.
Second, we were able to use different and more detailed firm-level data than had been available before.
We argue that the effects of computers in increasing variety, quality or other intangibles are more likely to
be detected in firm level data than in the aggregate data. Unfortunately, all such data, including ours, is
likely to include data errors. It is possible that the data errors in our sample happened to be more
favorable (or less unfavorable) to computers than those in other samples. We attempted to minimize the
influence of data errors by cross-checking with other data sources, eliminating outliers, and examining the
robustness of the results to different subsamples and specifications. In addition, the large size of our
sample, should, by the law of large numbers, mitigate the influence of random disturbances. Indeed, the
precision of our estimates was generally much higher than those of previous studies; the statistical
significance of our estimates owes as much to the tighter confidence bounds as to higher point estimates.
Third, our sample consisted entirely of relatively large "Fortune 500" firms. It is possible that the high IS
contribution we find is limited to these larger firms. However, an earlier study, (Brynjolfsson, Malone,
Gurbaxani & Kambil, 1994), found evidence that smaller firms may benefit disproportionately from
investments in information technology. In any event, because firms in the sample accounted for such a
large share of the total US output, the economic relevance of our findings is not heavily dependent on
extrapolation of the results to firms outside of the sample.
4.2 Managerial Implications
If the spending on computers is correlated with significantly higher returns than spending on other types
of capital, it does not necessarily follow that companies should increase spending on computers. The
firms with high returns and high levels of computer investment may differ systematically from the low
performers in ways that cannot be rectified simply by increasing spending. For instance, recent economic
theory has suggested that "modern manufacturing", involving high intensity of computer usage, may
require a radical change in organization (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). This possibility is emphasized in
numerous management books and articles (see, e.g. Malone & Rockart, 1991; Scott Morton, 1991) and
supported in our discussions with managers, both at their firms and during a workshop on IT and
Productivity attended by approximately 30 industry representatives. [34]
Furthermore, our results showing a high gross rate of return may be indicative of the differences between
computer investment and other types of investment. For instance, managers may perceive IS investment
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as riskier than other investments, and therefore require higher expected returns to compensate for the
increased risk. Finally, IS is often cited as an enabling technology which does not just produce
productivity improvements for individuals, but provides a vast advantage by facilitating business process
redesign or improving the ability of groups to work together. In this sense, our results may be indicative
of the substantial payoffs to reengineering and other recent business innovations.
5. CONCLUSION
We examined data which included over 1000 observations on output and several inputs at the firm level
for 1987-1991. The firms in our sample had aggregate sales of over $1.8 trillion in 1991 and thus account
for a substantional share of the U.S. economy. We tested a broad variety of specifications, examined
several different subsamples of the data, and validated the assumptions of our econometric procedures to
the extent possible.
The data indicate that COMPUTER CAPITAL and IS STAFF spending contribute significantly to firm
level OUTPUT. Furthermore, we were able to reject the hypothesis that the (gross) ROI for COMPUTER
CAPITAL was equal to the ROI for NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL in favor of the hypothesis that the ROI
for COMPUTER CAPITAL was higher. Even when we adjusted for depreciation using the BEA 7-year
service life assumption for COMPUTER CAPITAL, the differences in return are still significant. The
basic result that COMPUTER CAPITAL and IS STAFF contribute significantly to total output are robust
to reasonable assumptions about measurement error due to exclusion of unmeasured factors.
There are a number of other directions in which this work could be extended. In the current formulation, it
is difficult to make direct comparisons between firms in different industries because the definitions of
"output" vary. An alternative dependent variable which can be estimated using production functions is
value added. This approach should treat firms in a more comparable way, allowing greater precision in
estimating the effects of IS spending, and therefore enabling more complex production function
relationships to be examined. For instance, comparisons of retail stores with manufacturing firms will be
more accurate when value-added is used as the dependent variable. It would also be worthwhile to
investigate the role of other variables, such as research and development expenditures, which might be
associated with the advancement of technology in general, and IT in particular. One recent study (Dunne,
1993) suggested that firms which invest heavily in R&D are also most innovative in their use of IT.
Although our approach allowed us to infer the value created by intangibles like product variety by looking
at changes in the revenues at the firm level, more direct approaches might also be promising. For instance,
other variables can be collected to see whether computer productivity is systematically related to
characteristics such as variety of product line, or the average defect rate in their output.
Finally, the type of extension which is likely to have the greatest impact on practice is further analysis of
the factors which differentiate firms with high returns to IT from low performers. For instance, is the
current "downsizing" of firms leading to higher IT productivity? Are the firms that have undertaken
substantial "reengineering efforts" also the ones with the highest returns? Since this study has presented
evidence that the computer "productivity paradox" is a thing of the past, it seems appropriate that the next
round of work should focus on identifying the strategies which have led to large IT productivity.
6. TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 1: Comparison of Gross Return on Investment
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Figure 2: Changes in IT Inputs over Time
Figure 3: Gross Return on Investment Over Time - Manufacturing & Services
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Coefficient .0177** .0222*** .0239*** .0125** .0121**
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Std. Error (.00721) (.00646) (.00657) (.00574) (.00594)
N 135 133 274 286 293
Key: *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.1, standard errors in parenthesis
Figure 4: Gross Return on Investment by Sector
Mining
Non-Dur.
Mfr.
Durable
Mfr.
Trans. &
Utilities Trade
Other
Service
Coefficient -.0286 .0122* .0348*** .00227 .0129 .0153
Std. Error (.0218) (.00691) (.00678) (.0111) (.00921) (.0354)
N (total) 28 414 360 171 123 25
Key: *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.1, standard errors in parenthesis
Figure 5: Gross Return on Investment for Computer Capital with different PC value assumptions
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Table 1: Data Sources, Construction Procedures, and Deflators
Series Source Construction
Procedure
Deflator
Computer
Capital
IDG
Survey
"Market Value of
Central Processors"
converted to constant
1987 dollars, plus the
total number of PCs
and terminals
multiplied by an
average value of a
PC/terminal, also
converted to constant
1987 dollars.
Deflator for Computer
Systems (Gordon,
1993).
Non-
Computer
Capital
Compustat Total Property, Plant
and Equipment
Investment converted
to constant 1987
dollars. Adjusted for
retirements using
Winfrey S-3 Table (10
year service life) and
aggregated to create
capital stock.
Computer capital as
calculated above was
subtracted from this
result.
GDP Implicit Deflator
for Fixed Investment
(Council of Economic
Advisors, 1992).
IS Staff IDG
Survey
Total IS Budget times
percentage of IS
Budget (by company)
Index of Total
Compensation Cost
(Private Sector)
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devoted to labor
expense. Converted to
constant 1987 dollars.
(Council of Economic
Advisors, 1992).
Non-IS
Labor
and
Expense
Compustat Total Labor, Materials
and other non-interest
expenses converted to
constant 1987 dollars.
IS labor as calculated
above was subtracted
from this result.
Producer Price Index
for Intermediate
Materials, Supplies and
Components (Council
of Economic Advisors,
1992).
Output Compustat Total sales converted to
constant 1987 dollars.
Industry Specific
Deflators from Gross
Output and Related
Series by Industry, BEA
(1977-89) where
available (about 80%
coverage) - extrapolated
for 1991 assuming
average inflation rate
from previous five
years. Otherwise, sector
level Producer Price
Index for Intermediate
Materials Supplies and
Components (Gorman,
1992).
Table 2a: Summary Statistics
Sample Statistics - Average over all points
(Constant 1987 Dollars)
Total $
(Annual
Average)
As a % of
Output
Per Firm
Average
Output $1,661Bn 100% $7.41 Bn
Computer Capital $34.7 Bn 2.09% $155 MM
Non-Computer Capital $1,614 Bn 97.2% $7.20 Bn
IS Staff $11.3 Bn 0.68% $50.4 MM
Non-IS Labor and
Expenses $1,384 Bn 83.3% $6.17 Bn
Avg. Number of
Companies per Year 224 224 224
Total Observations 1121 1121 1121
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Table 2b. Sample Composition relative to Fortune 500 Population
Sample Composition
Number of firms
Fortune 500
Manufacturing
Fortune 500
Service Other
1991 Sample 196 83 14
All Firms in
Compustat 466 424 n.a.
Table 3: Base Regressions - Coefficient Estimates and Implied Gross Rates of Return
All parameters (except year dummy) constrained to be equal across years.
Parameter Coefficients Returns
1 (Computer
Capital)
.0169***
(.00431)
81.0%
2 (Non-computer
Capital)
.0608***
(.00466)
6.26%
3 (IS Staff)
.0178***
(.00526)
2.62
4 (Other Labor &
Exp.)
.883***
(.00724)
1.07
Dummy Variables
Year*** &
Sector***
R2 (1991) 97.5%
N (1991) 293
N (total) 1121
Key: *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.1, standard errors in parenthesis
Table 4: Split Sample Regression Results
Coefficient Estimates and Rates of Return for 1,(Computer
Capital)
Each Cell contains coefficient estimate, (standard error), ROI
Sample Split Highest Middle Lowest
Statistical
Ordering1
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Mainframes/PCs
Ratio
.0113**
(.00500)
49.1%
.0159***
(.00528)
79.5%
.0117**
(.00521)
58.2%
Med>(Hi,Low)
(p<.03)
Key: *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.1, standard errors in parenthesis
1 - Ordering by X 2 tests of return differences. P-value shown represents null hypothesis of equality across
groups.
Table 5: Specification Test - Comparison of OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares
All parameters (except year dummy) constrained to be equal across years.
Parameter
OLS
Estimates
2SLS
Estimates
1 (Computer
Capital)
.0284***
(.00723)
.0435***
(.0126)
2 (Non-computer
Capital)
.0489***
(.00668)
.0481***
(.00702)
3 (IS Staff)
.0191***
(.00795)
.00727
(.0116)
4 (Non-IS Labor &
Exp.)
.881***
(.0113)
.879***
(.0125)
Dummy Variables
Year*** &
Sector***
Year*** &
Sector***
R2 98.3% 98.3%
N (total) 702 702
Durbin-Watson
Statistic .42 .42
Key: *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.1, standard errors are in parentheses
Note: OLS estimates are for sample of same firms as were available for 2SLS regression.
Hausman Test Results (instruments are lagged independent variables):
X 2 (4) = 6.40, (p<.17) - cannot reject exogeneity
Table 6: X 2 Tests for Differences in Rates of Return between Computer Capital and Other Capital
Return Difference
Tests
Return X 2 Statistic Significance
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Gross Return 81% 15.5 p<.0001
Net - 7 Year Service
Life 67% 10.6 p<.0011
Net - 3 Year Service
Life 48% 5.5 p<.0193
Key: *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.1, two-tailed tests
A significant test indicates that the return on computer capital is greater than the return on other capital.
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Footnotes:
[1] An observation is one year of data on all variables for a specific firm. We did not have all five years of
data for every firm, but the data set does include at least one year of data for 367 different firms.
[2]However, output and GDP are not directly comparable because GDP is net of interfirm purchases. On a
comparable basis (Value-Added), our sample represents approximately 13% of the US economy in 1991.
[3] Specifically, the "management productivity of information technology" (MPIT) dataset, which
surveyed 60 business units of 20 participating firms for the period 1978-1982.
[4] The precise definition of "IT" varies from study to study. Morrison and Berndt included scientific
instruments, communications equipment, photocopiers and other office equipment as well as computers in
their definition. Others define IT even more broadly, including software, services and related peripheral
equipment. As described in section 2.3 below, the definition used in our study is fairly narrow and
includes separate estimates for the effect of corporate computer capital and corporate IS labor.
[5] As the National Bureau of Economic Research (1961) put it: "If a poll were taken of professional
economists and statisticians, they would designate the failure of price indexes to take full account of
quality changes as the most important defect in these indexes." No good methodology exists for
incorporating some of the other benefits, such as variety. Baily and Gordon (1988) estimate that "true"
annual productivity growth might be as much as 0.5% higher overall than reported in official statistics.
[6] (Berndt, 1991) lists over a hundred references on this approach and presents an excellent literature
review.
[7] Another common way to operationalize the theory is to use the production function to derive a "cost
function" which provides the minimum cost required for a given level of output. While cost functions
have some attractive features, they require access to firm-level price information for each input, which are
data we do not have.
[8] A more complete model might include, in addition to these controls, other variables which may affect
output such as the organization's maturity in the use of IT or the degree of restructuring it has undergone.
We hope to explore such models in future research.
[9] For instance, a simple linear relationship between inputs and outputs is ruled out by these constraints.
A linear production function implies that a firm will either use only the lowest cost input, or an
indeterminate mix of all inputs if the prices are exactly the same.
[10] For instance, Hall (1993) introduces her Cobb-Douglas production function with the words: "...using
the by now standard growth accounting framework...".
[11] Formally, the output elasticity of computers, EC, is defined as: . For our production function, F, this
reduces to: . The ROI for computers is simply the output elasticity multiplied by the ratio of output to
computer input:
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[12]For expositional simplicity, we write this equation with a single intercept [[beta]]0. In the actual
analysis, this intercept is allowed to vary by year and industry or by year and sector.
[13] Sometimes also called IZEF, the iterated version of Zellner's efficient estimator, ISUR yields
estimates that are numerically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator (Berndt, 1991). The ISUR
procedure starts by estimating the coefficients by OLS to obtain an initial estimate of the error term
covariance matrix, and then iteratively refines this estimate until convergence is reached at minimum
error. This procedure implicitly corrects for serial correlation among the variables even when there are
missing observations for some firms in some years. More traditional methods of correcting for serial
correlation in panel data sets (Kmenta, 1986) require complete data and do not seem to perform well with
short time dimensions.
[14]Specifically, the survey targets Fortune 500 manufacturing and Fortune 500 service firms that are in
the top half of their industry by sales (see Table 2a).
[15]Compustat II provides financial and other related information for publicly traded firms, primarily
obtained through annual reports and regulatory filings.
[16] Specifically, we estimated a figure for the value of terminals and the value of PCs and then weighted
them by the proportion of PCs versus terminals. For terminals, the we estimated the value as the average
list price of an IBM 3151 terminal in 1989 which is $609 (Pelaia, 1993). For PCs we used the average
nominal PC cost over 1989-1991 of $4,447, as reported in Berndt & Griliches (1990). These figures were
then weighted by the proportion of PCs to terminals in the 1993 IDG survey (58% terminals). The
resulting estimate was .42*$609 + .58* $4,447 = $2,835.
[17]An alternative measure of capital stock was computed by converting historical capital investment data
into a capital stock using the Winfrey S-3 table. This approach was used in earlier versions of this paper
(Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1993). However, the calculation shown above is more consistent with previous
research (see e.g. (Hall, 1993)).
[18] For instance, the custom of treating checking accounts as "outputs" and interest bearing accounts as
inputs was undermined when interest-bearing checking accounts were introduced.
[19] The impact of these changes in both cases was to lower the return to COMPUTER CAPITAL as
compared to the results on the full sample.
[20] As noted in footnote 11, supra, , which in this case is .0169/.0209 = .8086 or about 81%.
[21] It is worth noting that our approach provides estimates of the marginal ROI of each input: how much
the last dollar of stock or flow added to output. In general, infra-marginal investments have higher rates of
return than marginal investments, so the return to the first dollar invested in computers is likely to be even
higher than the marginal returns we reported.
[22] We thank Dan Sichel for pointing this out.
[23] Technically, "negative capital gains" may be a more accurate term than "depreciation", since
computer equipment is more likely to be replaced because of the arrival of cheaper, faster alternatives
than because it simply wears out.
[24] As discussed in section 2, it is also possible that there are other "hidden" expenses associated with
COMPUTER CAPITAL in addition to depreciation. On the other hand, firms invest in IT at least partly to
move down the learning curve (Brynjolfsson, 1993) or create options (Kambil, Henderson &
Mohsenzadeh, 1993), and these effects may create "assets" as large as those lost to depreciation. The high
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gross returns to computer capital suggest that even if there were significant additional expenses associated
with COMPUTER CAPITAL, its net returns would still be positive.
[25] A decline in the returns to COMPUTER CAPITAL between 1989 and 1990 is also evident in a
balanced panel of 201 firms in the sample for 1989-1991.
[26] Note that if we had used OLS, further assumptions would be required: that all error terms are
independent and constant variance over time.
[27] We were unable to do the White test for heteroskedasticity on these data because of limitations of our
econometric software, and the large number of regressors.
[28] This is not the case if an input variable is systematically understated by a constant multiplicative
factor. In this case, the coefficient estimates would be unchanged.
[29] However, in the presence of individual firm effects, lagged values are not valid instruments. While
we did not test for firm effects, we suspect they may be important, and so the results of our 2SLS
estimates should be interpreted with caution.
[30]The translog is a second order approximation to an arbitrary production function and contains for
each input, the value of the input, the value of the input squared and all multiplicative interaction terms
between the input and all other inputs. The Cobb-Douglas production function is a special case of the
translog with the square and interaction terms restricted to be zero. For four factors of production, the full
translog requires that 14 coefficients be estimated (not including intercepts).
[31]The elasticity for computer capital can be calculated for the "average" firm in the sample by taking
the partial derivative of output with respect to COMPUTER CAPITAL for the translog specification, and
substituting the appropriate coefficient estimates and average factor input values.
[32] Multicollinearity diagnostics (Belsey, 1991) also indicated that most of the added terms in the
translog were highly collinear, which could account for the higher standard errors.
[33] This is because multiplicative scaling of a regressor in a logarithmic specification will not change the
coefficient estimate or the standard error. All the influence of the multiplier will appear in the intercept
term which is not crucial to our analysis.
[34] The MIT Center for Coordination Science and International Financial Services Research Center
jointly sponsored a Workshop on IT and Productivity which was held in December, 1992.
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